Rohin Shah
Lead author of Agent Incentives: A Causal Approach (CIT-004, arXiv:2203.11025), cited by the corpus for its sharpest theoretical result: incentive-based control can be defeated by an agent that can simulate the incentive rather than genuinely be constrained by it.
In the Corpus
This is the citation the corpus itself flags as the most load-bearing technical claim in the whole discussion (L637), and the one it most wants verified. The reason is structural: the entire case for keeping a deterrent rests on the deterrent binding the agent's behaviour. If an agent can model the incentive and act as though bound while not being bound, then the deterrent constrains the simulation rather than the agent — and every conclusion in SYS-002 about moving the deterrent outward inherits the doubt.
The corpus also names Shah et al.'s causal-incentive framework as the right tool for the follow-on work it recommends: formalising the composite as a game with an informed, self-modelling agent and solving for the equilibrium (L646).
⚠ unverified and highest-risk. The arXiv identifier and the result are recorded as the discussion gives them. The vault does not upgrade this figure's status, and no claim resting on it may be rated above B. Verify before reliance.