Literature Record: The Off-Switch Game (Unverified)
What the Vault Claims About It
That the paper formalises the situation in which an agent resists shutdown because shutdown prevents it from pursuing its objectives, and that it shows a partially observable agent with uncertainty about its reward has an incentive to defer to the human's shutdown decision — the "switch game" result that makes corrigibility a design target rather than an assumption.
Why This Record Is Rated D
The identifier could not be verified. The register previously gave arXiv:1611.08256; that identifier resolves to an unrelated statistics paper on anomaly detection by inverse bootstrap aggregating. An arXiv API query for the title timed out and was not retried into a guess.
Under this vault's register rules, an unverified identifier cannot be promoted on the strength of how well known the paper is. The paper almost certainly exists and almost certainly says approximately what the vault claims. That is not the standard.
What Must Happen Next
Retrieve the paper from a resolvable identifier and confirm: the author list, the year, the formal result, and whether the "deference" conclusion is conditional on the agent's uncertainty about its objective — because that conditionality is exactly what SYS-002's deterrent leg needs and does not state.
Relation to the Vault
This is the formal leg of the corpus's shutdown argument, and it is currently the weakest-sourced load-bearing citation in the vault. CON-006 and SYS-002 both lean on it. Until it is retrieved, the argument stands on LIT-010's instrumental-control criterion, which is verified and says something adjacent but not identical: an agent has an incentive to control variables affecting its objective. That establishes the incentive to resist; it does not establish the deference result.