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    FOR-001 / 70_LiteratureLIT-009

    Frontier AI Regulation: Managing Emerging Risks to Public Safety

    Verified literature

    title
    Frontier AI Regulation: Managing Emerging Risks to Public Safety
    Type
    literature
    Identifier
    LIT-009
    Citation
    CIT-019
    authors
    • Markus Anderljung
    • Joslyn Barnhart
    • Anton Korinek
    • Jade Leung
    • Cullen O'Keefe
    • Jess Whittlestone
    • Shahar Avin
    • Miles Brundage
    • and 16 further authors
    year
    2023
    venue
    arXiv preprint (v4, 7 November 2023)
    identifier
    arXiv:2307.03718
    url
    https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.03718
    retrieved
    2026-11-13
    Textual authority
    B
    Corroboration
    4
    Status
    Verified
    bears on
    • [[SYS-003]]
    • [[CNF-007]]
    • [[CON-008]]
    contests
      Tags
      • literature
      • regulation
      • frontier-ai
      • institutions
      • verified

      Literature Record: Frontier AI Regulation

      What It Establishes

      The paper defines frontier AI — highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety — and argues these pose a distinct regulatory challenge because the dangerous capabilities are hard to assess before deployment and because development is concentrated in a small number of firms.

      Its contribution is a regulatory instrument set rather than a single proposal: standard-setting, registration and reporting, licensing or permitting for training runs above thresholds, third-party evaluation, and liability allocation. Twenty-four authors from across the field's institutions is itself a signal about where the policy consensus sat in 2023.

      Rating Justification

      • Textual Authority (B): retrieved at abstract level; preprint, not peer-reviewed.
      • Corroboration (4): the instrument set it proposes is substantially the instrument set that was subsequently enacted — the EU AI Act's systemic-risk obligations (LIT-012) are recognisably this design. Policy uptake is independent corroboration.

      What It Does Not Show

      It does not settle which instrument binds. It is a menu, and the vault's proposal picks from a different menu — private law and cryptographic custody rather than licensing and evaluation. The paper therefore does not refute SYS-003; it demonstrates that the design space SYS-003 claims to occupy was already populated when the proposal was written.

      Relation to the Vault

      This is the document that makes gap 5 concrete. SYS-003 designs a legal-architectural regime — privilege, custody, node sovereignty — without engaging the regulatory architecture that was being built at the same time and for the same problem. See CNF-007.

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